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Secrecy and Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Earnings Quality  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on earnings quality in countries 
which exhibit high financial secrecy. Earnings quality is proxied by signed abnormal accruals 
and earnings conservatism. Using 19,324 firm-years from 14 countries over the period 1998-
2011, we find that firms in a high-secrecy country tend to report higher abnormal accruals 
and earnings conservatism, which results in lower earnings quality. On the other hand, we 
find that mandatory IFRS adoption improves earnings quality by decreasing abnormal 
accruals and earnings conservatism. Our study provides evidence of the interaction between 
national culture, as indicated by secrecy, and IFRS adoption and helps to explain differences 
in earnings quality across different jurisdictions following IFRS adoption.   
Key Words: Earnings quality; national culture; secrecy; mandatory IFRS adoption; signed 
abnormal accruals; earnings conservatism   
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Secrecy and Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Earnings Quality  
 
1. Introduction 
As of November 2014, over 120 jurisdictions/countries around the world have adopted 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in one form or another (Delloite, 2014). 
Obviously, all these countries/jurisdictions have different cultures and institutional settings. 
Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) and Ball (2006) suggest that differences in institutional 
environments are likely to lead to differences in quality of financial reporting even though the 
same accounting standards were applied to all countries. Specifically, there is mixed evidence 
on the quality of financial reporting following IFRS adoption.  While several studies 
document improved earnings quality following IFRS adoption (e.g., Barth, Landsman and 
Lang, 2008; Leuz, Dhananjay and Wysocki, 2003), others provide evidence of either no 
improvement or decline in earnings quality (e.g., Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011; 
Jeanjean and Stowlowy, 2008). 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of national culture, as indicated by secrecy, on 
earnings quality following IFRS adoption. In particular, we explore whether mandatory IFRS 
adoption has any impact on earnings quality in countries with high financial secrecy.  Our 
study is motivated by strong evidence that culture plays an important role in financial 
reporting choices and quality (Callen, Morel and Richardson, 2010; Desender, Castro and 
Leon, 2011; Doupnik and Perera, 2009; Feleaga, Dragomir and Fleaga, 2010; Gray and Vint, 
1995; Salter and Niswander, 1995).  Given the vast majority of the countries that have 
adopted IFRS have diverse national cultures (in addition to other institutional differences), it 
is likely IFRS adoption will not have the same effect on earnings quality across all the 
adopting countries. We are also motivated by lack of any evidence on the interaction between 
national culture and IFRS adoption. Our study is likely to inform the debate why earnings 
quality varies across countries that have adopted IFRS.  
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We analyse 19,324 observations across 14 countries over the period 1998-2011. We 
measure earning quality in two ways: magnitude of abnormal accruals and earnings 
conservatism. Our measure of financial secrecy is based on the financial secrecy index (FSI) 
of National Tax Justice Network (2011). In signed abnormal accruals analysis, we find that 
signed abnormal accruals are higher in countries with high financial secrecy suggesting 
higher earnings management. However, the interaction between mandatory IFRS adoption 
and financial secrecy is negative. This result suggests that the effect of financial secrecy on 
earnings quality is mediated by mandatory IFRS adoption.  We find similar results in 
earnings conservatism analysis. The relation between secrecy and earnings conservatism is 
positive while the relation between mandatory IFRS adoption and earnings conservatism is 
negative. Moreover, the interaction between IFRS adoption and financial secrecy suggests 
that mandatory IFRS adoption e improves earnings conservatism. Our results are robust to 
several sensitivity tests, including alternatives measures of secrecy, alternative measures of 
investor protection and alternative sample compositions. 
Our study makes a single but important contribution to the cross-country literature on 
IFRS adoption. Specifically, our study provides evidence of how IFRS adoption can have 
differential impact on earnings quality depending on national culture, as indicated by the 
level of financial secrecy.  Although  the differential impact  of IFRS adoption on  earnings 
quality  due to differences in  institutional environments such as investor protection and 
enforcement of accounting standards have been documented, our study is the first one to 
document an interaction  between IFRS adoption and national culture.  
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. We set out the theoretical 
framework and background in section 2 and hypothesis development in section 3. In section 
4, we present research design and sample selection process and results in section 5. Finally, 
our conclusion is in section 6 
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2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Many researchers have addressed issues related to the importance of macro level factors and 
their impact on economic activity. Macro level factors include investor protection, taxation 
system, judiciary independence and the legal system, the financing system and national 
culture. Several studies report that the legal regime of a country can influence the financial 
disclosures or accounting quality (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Jaggi and Low, 2000). 
Investor protection regime is also a factor influencing on earnings quality because lower 
earnings quality is less likely to occur in countries with stronger investor protection. For 
example, Hung (2000), using 17,743 firm year observations across 21 countries, finds that 
there is a negative relation between accrual accounting and the value relevance of financial 
statements in countries with weak investor protection regime. In addition, Leuz, Nanda and 
Wyscocki (2003) using data from 31 countries show that countries with „arm‟s length‟ 
institutional features have lower levels of earnings management than do countries with 
„insider‟ institutional characteristics.  
Teets (2002) argues that earnings quality is a multidimensional concept affected by at 
least three sets of decisions: decisions made by standard setters, choices made by 
management by which accounting methods should be chosen, and judgments and estimates 
made by management to implement the chosen alternatives. In order to evaluate earnings 
quality, prior studies consider factors such as the magnitude of signed abnormal accruals 
(Francis and Wang, 2008; Houqe et al. 2012 and earnings conservatism (Givoly and Hayn, 
2000; Artiach and Clarkson, 2012). Therefore, in this study we use two proxies for earnings 
quality, namely signed abnormal accruals and earnings conservatism. DeFond and Park use 
abnormal accruals measure and find a higher earnings response coefficient when abnormal 
accruals suppress the magnitude of earnings surprises, and lower earnings response 
coefficient when abnormal accruals exaggerate the magnitude of earnings surprise. Francis 
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and Wang (2008) also use signed abnormal accruals analysis to detect the relation between 
investor protection and earning quality. Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) investigate the 
effectiveness of using estimating abnormal accruals in detecting event-specific earnings 
management. They find that the power of accruals models in detecting event-specific 
management varies across quarters depending on managerial incentives and opportunities for 
earnings management. In addition, earnings conservatism is a good indicator for earnings 
quality. LaFond and Watts (2007) argue that information asymmetry between inside and 
outside investors creates conservatism in financial statements. Moreover information 
asymmetry is significantly positively associated with conservatism after controlling for other 
demands for conservatism. Thus, conservatism reduces manager‟s incentives to manipulate 
accounting numbers and reduces information asymmetry, which increases earnings quality. 
2.1. Culture and earnings quality 
National culture is considered to be a factor that influences the accounting system of a 
country. Hofstede (1980) found four cultural dimensions that can be used to describe the 
similarities and differences in cultures: individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance 
and masculinity. Based on Hofstede‟s cultural dimensions, Gray (1988) defined four widely 
recognized accounting values; these are professionalism, uniformity, conservatism and 
secrecy. He developed a model about the relation between Hofstede‟s cultural dimensions 
and accounting sub-culture and argued that there is a relationship between culture and 
accounting values.  
Several studies have examined Gray‟s model and the relationship between Hofstede‟s 
culture value and national accounting systems. Salter and Niswander (1995) tested Gray‟s 
model and found it best at explaining actual financial reporting practices but weak in 
explaining legal and professional structures. Furthermore, they showed that the development 
of financial markets and levels of taxation enhance the explanations offered by Gray (1988). 
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Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) showed that there is a relation between change in culture 
values and change in accounting. In addition, Gray and Vint (1995) tested the effect of 
culture on accounting information disclosure and found strong relations between societies‟ 
culture value (uncertainty avoidance and individualism) and accounting information 
disclosure.  
Desender et al. (2011) hypothesize that countries with higher levels of individualism 
or egalitarianism have lower levels of earnings quality; they also test the other cultural 
dimensions as part of the robustness analysis. They find evidence that various cultural groups 
have significant differences in earnings management. In particular, they find that 
individualism is highly significant and negatively related with earnings management whereas 
egalitarianism correlates positively with lower corruption and greater transparency in 
financial markets. 
Accounting is clearly affected by organizational and national culture (Asiyaban and 
Abdoli, 2012). For example, Jaggi and Low (2000) research the impact of culture, market 
forces, and legal system on financial disclosures. They find that the relationship between the 
cultural value of individualism and financial disclosures is significant for code law countries 
but that uncertainty avoidance and power distance have insignificant effects on financial 
disclosure in both common law and code law countries. Given that the level of financial 
disclosure by firms in common law countries is higher than that in code law countries the 
influence of cultural values on financial disclosures by firms will be less important in 
common law countries. A few cross-country studies investigate the relation between culture 
and earnings quality as well as earnings management. Callen et al. (2011) use cross-country 
data to research the impact of culture and religion on earnings management. They find that 
earnings management is negatively and significantly related to individualism and positively 
related to uncertainty avoidance. This is consistent with the research of Richardson (2008). 
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Based on data from 47 countries and after controlling for economic development, Richardson 
indicates that the higher the level of uncertainty avoidance and the lower level of the 
individualism, the higher is the level of tax evasion across countries. In addition, Tsakumis, 
Curatola and Porcano (2007) investigate the relation between national cultural dimensions 
and tax evasion across 50 countries and find that uncertainty avoidance is positively 
associated with tax evasion levels. Higher individualism is associated with lower tax evasion 
across countries. 
However, the impact of culture on earnings quality is still debatable because of mixed 
empirical evidence. Han, Kang, Slater and Yoo (2010) observe that earnings management 
decreases (increases) with uncertainty avoidance in weak (strong) investor protection 
countries. Furthermore, there is evidence that there is more earning management in 
individualistic societies than in collective societies; individualism has greater influence on 
earnings management in strong investor protection regimes, which is in contrast to the results 
of Callen et al. (2011). Guan and Pourjalali (2010) examine the possible impact of cross-
country differences in culture on earnings management in 27 countries. The results indicate 
that uncertainty avoidance affects the direction of earnings management downwards; the 
higher the values of individualism, the higher the magnitude of earnings management. The 
mixed findings documented by studies highlight that the effect of national culture on earnings 
quality can vary across different countries. 
2.2. IFRS adoption and earnings quality 
The aim of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is to develop a single set of 
high quality, understandable, enforceable and globally accepted financial reporting standards 
based upon clearly articulated principles (IASB, 2012). Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer and 
Riedl (2010) investigate the equity market reaction to adoption of IFRS in Europe. The 
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results show that European investors and firms reacted positively to the adoption of IFRS and 
information quality improved with lower information asymmetry in the post-adoption period.  
The adoption of a common set of accounting standards improves earnings quality 
because IFRS reporting increases transparency. Additionally, financial statement 
comparability helps investors to evaluate potential investment in foreign capital market more 
easily and, therefore, risk is reduced (Doupnik & Perera, 2009, p.71). One set of global 
accounting standards would reduce the cost of preparing worldwide consolidated financial 
statements and the cost of reconciliation between different standards (Doupnik & Perera, 
2009, p.71). Horton, Serafeim and Serafeim (2010) test for differences in forecast errors 
before and after the IFRS mandatory compliance. They find that IFRS improves the 
information environment. Specifically, after mandatory IFRS adoption, forecast accuracy and 
other measures of the information environment increase significantly.  Similarly, for 
voluntary adoption. Another advantage of IFRS adoption is to increase market liquidity and 
decrease cost of capital for firms (Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi, 2008). However, Daske et al. 
(2008) point out that the capital- market benefits occur only in countries with strong 
enforcement regimes and in countries where the institutional environment provides strong 
incentives to firms to be transparent. Although the adoption of IFRS eliminates national 
accounting differences in these countries, the earnings quality remain different in each 
country (Houqe et al. 2012). This is so because culture, legal system and other factors can 
lead to different interpretations of standards and different levels of compliance across 
countries, leading to the incompatibility in financial statements (Doupnik and Perera, 2009, 
p.105). 
Research by Liu, Yao, Hu and Liu (2011) considers the impact of IFRS on accounting 
quality in China. China is a special case where the markets are disciplined mainly by the 
regulators rather than market mechanisms. Using a sample of 870 firms over the 2005 to 
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2008 period, Liu et al. (2011) find that accounting quality is improved after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS-convergent standards in China with decreased level of earnings 
management and earnings smoothing and increased value relevance to stock price and return. 
Chua, Cheong and Gould (2012) examine the impact of IFRS adoption on accounting quality 
in the context of the Australian capital market by focusing on earnings management, timely 
loss recognition and value relevance. Chua et al. (2012) find that the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS has generally enhanced earnings quality, especially in the form of less earnings 
smoothing behaviour. In addition, there is a higher probability that larger losses are reported 
in the post-adoption period than in the pre-adoption period; the value relevance of accounting 
data improved after IFRS adoption. All of the results support that there is an improvement in 
accounting quality after Australian listed companies moved from Australian GAAP to IFRS.  
After the adoption of IFRS, the quality of earnings reported by Malaysian companies 
is relatively higher than before the adoption (Wan Ismail, Kamarrudin, van Zijl & Dunstan, 
2012). Using 4010 observations over total six years, the results show that adoption of IFRS 
increases earnings quality. Specially, the absolute value of abnormal accrual is lower and the 
value-relevance of firm‟s earnings is higher after the adoption of IFRS. Evans, Houston, 
Peters and Pratt (2012) asked experienced financial officers from the U.S, Europe and Asia to 
participate in a web-based case exercise to compare allowable earnings management under 
GAAP and IFRS. They find that financial officers under IFRS receive more allowable 
reporting discretion than those under GAAP but there is no evidence that IFRS leads to a 
greater likelihood of earnings management relative to GAAP. Thus reporting regulatory 
environments allowing high levels of reporting discretion do not lead to more earning 
management but allow management to substitute accounting earning management for real 
earnings management (Evans et al. 2012). Contrary to above studies, Jeanjean and Stolowy 
(2008) analyse the effect of the mandatory introduction of IFRS on earnings management in 
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three first time adopters: France, Australia and the UK. Surprisingly, the pervasiveness of 
earnings management did not decline after the introduction of IFRS, in fact went up in 
France. They explain that management incentives and national institutional factors play an 
important role in framing financial reporting characteristics, probably more important than 
accounting standards alone.  
3. Hypothesis development 
Secrecy versus transparency reflects “a preference for confidentiality and the restriction of 
disclosure of information about the business only to those who are closely involved with its 
management and financing as opposed to a more transparent, open, and publicly accountable 
approach” (Doupnik and Perera, 2009, p.41). Gray (1988) argues that the accounting values 
of secrecy and conservatism have the greatest relevance for information disclosure in 
financial statements. In addition, he hypothesizes that a preference for secrecy is consistent 
with high level of uncertainty avoidance and power distance and the low level of 
individualism and masculinity. Doupnik and Perera (2009) suggest that secrecy and 
conservatism have a strong positive relation. Specifically, countries with high secrecy are 
expected to more strictly adhere to the notion of conservatism (high conservatism) in the 
measurement of assets and liabilities (Doupnik & Perera, 2009, p.43). Thus we draw on the 
relation between cultural dimensions such as power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism and masculinity and earning management to hypothesize the relation between 
secrecy and earnings quality. 
The relationship between cultural values and earnings management is a significant 
topic in accounting literature although it is unclear whether the relationship between them is 
positive or negative. Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007) show that earnings management is 
relatively high in countries with high uncertainty avoidance scores and relatively low in 
countries where English is the primary language. They conclude that culture is an important 
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determinant of accounting choice and should be considered by standards setters enacting and 
enforcing international financial reporting rules.  
Moreover, Callen et al. (2010) use a cross-country data set, the updated values of the 
Hofstede (1980, 1991) and cultural variables developed by Tang and Koveos (2008) to find 
that earnings management is negatively related to the updated Hofstede (1980) cultural 
variable of individualism and positively related to uncertainty avoidance.  
Kang, Lee, Jeffrey NG and Tay (2004) examine the relation between culture and 
accounting conservatism and show that managers from more conservative cultural 
environments tend to report lower estimates for future cash flows, which  means managers 
tend to create more conservative accounting choices. Moreover, cultural conservatism has 
more influence on managers‟ conservative accounting choices in code law countries where 
accounting is less conservative than in common law countries. Kang et al. (2004) suggest that 
culture and legal regimes can largely be viewed as substitutes in explaining managers‟ 
conservative accounting choices. Similarly, Feleaga, Dragomir and Feleaga (2010) indicate 
that companies in „conservative‟ countries do assign a significantly higher degree of 
uncertainty to their total amount of liabilities. This means that managers in „conservative‟ 
countries do produce more conservative accounting. Countries with high conservatism are 
expected to have high secrecy (Doupnik and Perera, 2009) thus the above results can be 
interpreted as firms in high secrecy countries have more accounting conservatism. 
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.There is negative relationship between secrecy and earnings quality. 
Prior studies on IFRS adoption try to understand the relation between mandatory 
IFRS adoption and earnings quality (Armstrong et al. 2010; Horton et al. 2010; Liu et al. 
2011; Chua et al. 2012). Arguments suggest that the adoption of mandatory IFRS has small 
or negligible effects on earning quality. Houqe et al. (2012) find that IFRS adoption per se 
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does not lead to increased earnings quality. However, there is evidence that earnings quality 
increase with IFRS adoption in countries with strong investor protection regimes via less 
earnings management, greater value relevance and greater earnings conservatism. Soderstrom 
and Sun (2008) review the impact of widespread IFRS adoption in the European Union on 
accounting quality. They argue that cross- country differences in accounting quality are likely 
to remain following IFRS adoption because accounting quality is a function of the firm‟s 
institutional setting, including the legal and political system of the country in which the firm 
resides.   
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) use 636 firm year observations for the period 1999- 
2001 in Germany to investigate whether there are changes in earnings management between 
IFRS adopters and the companies reporting under German GAAP. The results suggest that 
IFRS does not impose a significant constraint on earnings management. Interestingly, without 
the possibility of using hidden reserves to manage earnings, companies adopting IFRS 
engage more in earnings smoothing but this effect reduces if the company has a Big 4 
auditor. However, taking into account hidden reserve, IFRS adopters show no difference in 
earnings management behaviour compared to others. Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) 
conclude that the adoption of high quality standards is not a sufficient condition for acquiring 
high quality information in code law countries with a low investor protection regime such as 
Germany. Callao, Jarne and Lainez (2007) investigate the effects of IFRS on comparability 
and the relevance of financial statements in Spain by comparing financial information under 
Spanish and IFRS rules. The analysis reveals that Spanish firms applying IFRS continue to 
provide conservative financial information; local comparability is adversely influenced if 
both IFRS and local accounting standards are applied at the same time. This study found no 
improvement in value relevance after IFRS adoption.  
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In contrast with the above studies, Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) compare 
accounting quality metrics for firms applying IFRS to those applying non-US domestic 
standards in the post-adoption period. The results show that firms applying IFRS have less 
earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and more value relevance of accounting 
amounts than firms not applying IFRS. Moreover, the firms applying IFRS have higher 
accounting quality in the post-adoption period than they do in the pre- adoption period. 
Piot, Dumontier and Janin (2011) use a database of more than 5000 IFRS adopters 
from 22 Europe (EU) countries over the period 2001- 2008 to measure IFRS consequences on 
accounting conservatism within EU. They find that conditional conservatism decreased under 
IFRS for mandatory adopters as proxied by the asymmetric timeliness of earnings while 
unconditional conservatism is higher under IFRS in the presence of a Big 4 auditor. Lu 
(2012) investigated how accounting conservatism changes after mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Accounting conservatism will decrease if investors expect higher financial reporting quality 
under mandatory IFRS adoption but accounting conservatism will increase if investors expect 
accounting numbers to be less verifiable. To maintain financial reporting as a source of 
reliable information, firms improve the level of accounting conservatism. The study finds that 
the level of accounting conservatism decreases after mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Although the results are mixed we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. There is a positive relationship between IFRS adoption and earnings quality. 
Some researchers argue that accounting does not operate in a vacuum: it is „a product 
of its environment‟ (Armstrong et al. 2010). One important factor in the environment is 
culture and thus differences in culture can have a significant impact on financial disclosures. 
Therefore, this study argues that culture and mandatory IFRS adoption will have a joint effect 
on earning quality. For example, Doupnik and Riccio (2006) suggest that national cultural 
values can affect accountants‟ interpretation of probability expressions used in IFRS, and as a 
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result, differences in cultural values across countries could lead to differences in recognition 
and disclosure decisions based on those interpretations. They obtain strong support for that. 
Through culture‟s influence on the accounting value of secrecy, culture affects the 
interpretation of verbal probability expressions used to establish the threshold for when 
disclosures should be made 
Many researchers question the success of IFRS when there are several factors such as 
investor protection, securities regulation and culture affecting financial report preparers‟ 
incentives. Narktabtee and Patpanichchot (2011) examine the impact of country- level and 
firm- level factors on the effectiveness of IFRS adoption by evaluating the change in value 
relevance of earnings and book value of equity during pre- and post- IFRS adoption. The 
result indicates that the adoption of IFRS improves value relevance in all cases except the 
case where investor protection is weak and firms have characteristics which allow managers 
to use managerial discretion. Therefore, there is evidence that country- level and firm- level 
have effect on the effectiveness of IFRS adoption. In this study, we argue that the effect of 
IFRS adoption on earnings quality depends on culture, as indicated by the secrecy level.  
In the view of prior studies, our expectation is that a high level of secrecy discourages 
managers to share information with outside investors and creates information asymmetry. 
However, the adoption of high-quality standards mitigates the negative effect of secrecy and 
improves earnings quality. We develop the following hypothesis to test the joint effect of 
secrecy and IFRS adoption on earnings quality: 
Hypothesis 3. Earnings quality improves following IFRS adoption in high-secrecy countries 
compared to other countries. 
4. Research design 
4.1 Macro- level variables 
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Instead of applying Hofstede–Gray‟s model, we use a different proxy for secrecy- the 
Financial Secrecy Index (FSI) obtained from the U.S. Tax Justice Network (2011). The index 
was introduced in an effort to understand global financial secrecy, corruption and illicit 
financial flows. FSI is a comprehensive indicator of secrecy which comprises of both 
qualitative and quantitative measurements. Instead of combining only three dimensions as in 
Gray‟s model, the qualitative side of FSI considers laws, regulations, cooperation with 
information exchange process, and other verifiable data sources (Tax Justice Network, 2011). 
Quantitatively, a global score of secrecy is computed based on each jurisdiction‟s share of 
offshore financial services. Countries are then classified as either a High Secrecy country or a 
Low Secrecy country based on their Secrecy Score. Countries with a Secrecy Score above 50 
are said to be in a High Secrecy jurisdiction. And those with scores equal and below 50 are 
categorized as a Low Secrecy jurisdiction. 
Our study examines whether the quality of reported earnings is influenced by the 
degree of secrecy. Earnings quality is lower in countries with a high secrecy level because 
disclosure level is low and the secrecy level impacts the interpretation of probability 
expressions used in IFRS and thus leads to more accounting conservatism. In a cross-country 
study, the macro level factors also need to be considered because culture and accounting 
quality depend on these factors.  
We use the World Economic Forum (2011) data for all measures of macro-level 
variables. We use five country-level variables; these are judiciary independence, protection of 
minority shareholders‟ interests, regulation of securities exchange, irregular payments and 
bribes and financing through local equity market. Judicial independence is the idea that the 
judiciary needs to be kept separate from and independent of influences by other branches of 
government, citizens, or firms (World Economic Forum, 2012). Our measure of judicial 
independence ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 signifies heavily influenced and 7 signifies entirely 
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independent. Strong judicial independence is an indicator for competitive advantage of a 
country. However, it does not guarantee that a country with strong judicial independence has 
effective enforcement of accounting regulation. In prior research, Houqe et al. (2010) use 
judicial independence to examine the investor protection environment. The legal rules create 
features of a country‟s structure of corporate ownership and finance (La Porta, Lopez- de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). If a country with low judicial independence chose to 
have only bank financing of firms then the country will adjust its laws accordingly to give 
better protection to banks potentially at the expense of shareholders‟ interest (La Porta et al, 
1998). In this case, the disclosure requirements can be limited leading to lower quality of 
accounting information.   
The second country-level variable is protection of minority shareholders‟ interests. In 
particular, it measures the extent to which there is protection for the rights of outside 
investors against errant and manipulative management of inside investors through corporate 
law. More protection of minority shareholders‟ interest eliminates the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers and owners; therefore, the quality of accounting disclosure will be 
improved. Prior research shows that countries with strong protection of minority 
shareholders‟ rights limits insiders‟ ability to acquire private benefits and reduces incentives 
to corrupt accounting practices (Leuz et al. 2003; Francis and Wang, 2008). Boonlert-U-Thai, 
Meek and Nabar (2006) find that earnings are less smooth in countries whose institutional 
characteristics are strong. Moreover,  Francis, Khurana and Pereira (2003) document that 
financial disclosure are more transparent and national accounting standards require timelier 
reporting in a country with stronger investor protection. They also find evidence that higher 
quality standards and the enforcement of these standards is more likely exist in countries with 
strong investor protection. Therefore, strong protection of minority shareholders‟ interests is 
associated with high quality accounting information (Hung, 2001). 
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Regulation of securities exchange measures the ability of investors to assess the 
regulation and supervision of securities exchanges in countries (World Economic Forum, 
2012). Hail and Leuz (2006) show that the effectiveness of securities regulation has negative 
effects on the cost of equity capital. Effective security regulation requires firms to have 
certain disclosure levels and thus information asymmetries are limited (Hail and Leuz, 2006). 
Securities regulation can be measured by the disclosure requirement index and enforcement 
(La Porta, Lopez- de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006). Specifically, disclosure requirements reveal 
disclosure in the areas of prospectus, compensation, shareholders, inside ownership, contracts 
irregular and transactions (La Porta et al, 2006). Public enforcement indicates the market 
supervisor power, rule- making power and investigative power (La Porta et al, 2006). In our 
research we use the measure of World Economic Forum. The index is scaled from 1 to 7 
where 1 indicates that regulation of securities exchange is ineffective and 7 indicates that the 
regulation is effective. 
Irregular payments and bribes is the idea of how common it is for firms in a country 
to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with (1) imports and exports, (2) 
annual tax payments, (3) public utilities, (4) awarding of public contracts and licenses, (5) 
obtaining favourable judicial decisions (World Economic Forum, 2012). The final macro-
level variable that is considered in the research is financing through the local equity market 
which indicates the extent to which a company can raise money by issuing shares on the 
stock market; it is an indicator of the efficiency of the financial market. Other indicators 
include availability of financial services, affordability of financial services, ease of access to 
loans and venture capital availability. The development of financial markets creates 
opportunity for companies to raise funds but it also has certain requirements, restrictions and 
guidelines to maintain the integrity of the financial system. Francis et al. (2003) find that 
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higher quality accounting and auditing are positively related with financial development in 
countries whose legal systems support protection of investors.  
4.2 Sample selection. 
Company financial data for the period 1998 to 2011 was obtained from the Bloomberg 
Database. We excluded firm-year observations with missing values on dependent and 
independent variables. In addition, following prior research (Jaggi and Low, 2011; Francis 
and Wang, 2008) we delete financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies 
(Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 6000- 6999). We also exclude observations with any 
variables registering in the top or bottom 0.5% of the range of the variables in order to 
mitigate the effect of outliners. Finally, we drop observations with the absolute value of 
studentized residuals greater than 3 in the abnormal accruals analysis and in the accounting 
conservatism analysis. As a result of this selection process our sample consists of 19,324 firm 
year observations from 14 countries for the period 1998- 2011. The sample selection process 
is summarized in table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4.3 Signed abnormal accruals analysis 
Larger unexpected abnormal accruals imply greater management earnings and lower earnings 
quality; thus, abnormal accruals are a good indicator of earning quality of financial reporting. 
Several studies have used signed abnormal earnings as the measure of earnings quality 
(Houqe et al. 2012; Francis and Wang, 2008). In this research we use signed abnormal 
accruals rather than absolute abnormal accruals for two reasons. Firstly, the use of managerial 
manipulation to increase reported earnings is the main focus of the research.  In addition, 
there is evidence that signed abnormal accruals give a better measure of earnings quality than 
the unsigned value of abnormal accruals (Hribar and Nichols, 2007). 
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Jones (1991) explains working capital accruals and depreciation as a function of sales 
growth and property, plant and equipment but her model only explains about 10% of the 
variation in accruals (Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010). Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) 
modify the Jones model to adjust for growth in credit sales, increasing the power of the 
model to yield a residual that is uncorrelated with expected revenue accruals and detecting 
revenue manipulation (Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010). However, the modified model still 
contains the same limitations as the Jones model. In order to avoid that problem, Francis and 
Wang (2008) suggest applying a linear expectation model adapted from DeFond and Park 
(2001) that uses a firm‟s own prior year accruals in calculating the expectation benchmark. 
This model has several advantages. Firstly, the model limits cross-country differences in 
accounting principles by using a firm as its own control to identify abnormal accruals. 
Moreover, the model performs reliably in international settings (Francis and Wang, 2008). 
Thus, using the DeFond and Park (2001) model, our predicted accruals are measured as 
follows: 
Predicted accruals=   
,*                (
                            
                
)+ *                       
                       
                       
  +-
                     
        (1) 
Total accruals = (Earnings before extraordinary items- operating cash flows)/ total assets  
Abnormal accruals then are calculated as the firm‟s actual total accruals in year t minus 
predicted total accruals for year t.  
Model (2) below tests whether signed abnormal accruals are affected by financial 
secrecy and IFRS adoption after accounting for a set of firm-level controls that may affect 
accruals. 
Ab_Accrualsit = β0 + β1SEC + β2IFRS + β3SEC*IFRS + β4INV + β5LN_SALESit + 
β6F_LEVit + β7S_GWTHit + β8ΔPPEit + β9 CFOit + β10LAGLOSSit + fixed effects 
 
Where, 
  
Ab_Accruals = is the signed abnormal accruals of firm i in year t  
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SEC = is the Financial Secrecy Index from Tax Justice Network (2011).  
IFRS = takes the value of 1 for a given firm i in year t adopted IFRS 
mandatory basis and 0, otherwise. 
INV = is the investor protection measured by five proxies  
(i) JUD = is the judicial independence scores from World Economic Forum 
(2011) 
(ii) MIN = is the protection of minority shareholders‟ interest scores from 
World Economic Forum (2011) 
(iii) RSE = is the regulation of securities laws scores from World Economic 
Forum (2011) 
(iv) IIPB = is the irregular payment and bribes scores from World Economic 
Forum (2011) 
(v) FTEM = is the financing through local equity market scores from World 
Economic Forum (2011) 
LN_SALES = is natural logarithm of total sales of firm i in year t.  
F_LEV  = total long term debt divided by shareholders‟ equity of firm i in 
year t. 
S_GWTH = is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales 
in year t-1 and divided by sales year t-1  
ΔPPE  is the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE in year t 
minus the gross PPE in year t-1 and scaled by the gross PPE in 
year t-1 
CFO = is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total 
assets.  
LOSS = takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t reports negative income 
before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. 
Fixed effects are  
(i)Industry dummies = a vector of dummy variables indicating industry sector 
membership.  
(ii)Year dummies = a vector of dummy variables indicating year. 
 
The coefficients of primary interest are: β1, β2 and β3. The secrecy variable captures 
the effect of secrecy level on firms; the IFRS variable shows the relation between IFRS 
adoption and signed abnormal accruals. Moreover, β3, the coefficient on the interaction term 
measures the joint effect of secrecy and IFRS adoption on accruals. If β3 is negative and 
significant, there is evidence that IFRS adopters have higher earnings quality than non-IFRS 
adopters in country with high level of secrecy. 
The control variables are included based on prior research (Houqe et al. 2012; Francis 
and Wang, 2008). Company size (LN_SALES) is controlled because it has negative relation 
with accruals (Klein, 2002). Dechow and Dichev (2002) show accruals as a function of 
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current, past and future cash flows and find that smaller firms have more volatile cash flows, 
accruals and earnings and are likely to report a loss. Klein (2002) points out that leverage 
(F_LEV) is positively related to accruals thus we control the variable for leverage. Following 
the prior studies (Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper, 2005; McNichols, 2002; Houqe et 
al. 2012), we add growth in sales and PPE to the model of normal accruals. These variables 
can affect yearly accruals if the association between accruals and the accruals drivers (sales 
and gross PPE) is nonlinear (Francis and Wang, 2008). 
4.4 Earnings conservatism 
Conservatism is an important convention in accounting but it is difficult to measure. Givoly 
and Hayn (2000) argue that conservatism is a selection criterion between accounting 
principles that leads to the minimization of cumulative reported earnings by deferring 
revenue recognition, recognizing all probable expenses, lower asset valuation and higher 
liability valuation. They thus suggest using the sign and magnitude of accumulated accruals 
as an empirical measure to gauge the degree of accounting conservatism. Moreover, the rate 
of accumulation of net negative accruals is an indication of the shift in the degree 
conservative accounting (Givoly and Hayn, 2000). In our research, we examine the level of 
accounting conservatism resulting from both mandatory and discretionary policy choices 
before and after IFRS adoption. Therefore, in our view, the Artiach and Clarkson (2011) 
measure is the most suitable proxy to capture discretionary conservatism. We focus on non-
operating accruals because non- operating accruals consist of accruals arising from 
managerial action resulting from accounting regulations and accruals arising from managerial 
discretion in the timing and amount of accounting policy choice and accounting estimates 
(Artiach and Clarkson, 2011). 
 In addition, non-operating accruals are not likely to exhibit economic characteristics 
unrelated to conservatism (Givoly and Hayn, 2000). The accumulation of non-operating 
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accruals must be measured over a sufficiently long period to reveal persistence in 
accumulated accruals thus we use a six- year accumulation period which consistent with 
Ahmed et al. (2002), Artiach and Clarkson (2011) and Houqe, Kerr and Monem (2013). 
Similar to the Artiach and Clarkson (2011) model, our conservatism proxy is the average 
over a six year period of the ratios of non- operating accruals to total asset; the result is 
multiplied by -1 to produce an increasing measure of conservatism. Thus our measure is 
CONS= -1x⌈
 
 
∑
       
    
 
   
⌉ 
where, NOPACit is non- operating accruals and TAit is total assets, both for firms i at fiscal 
year-end t. We use this proxy to investigate the relationship between culture and earnings 
quality as well as the relationship between IFRS adoption and earnings quality. The model is 
used to test hypotheses one, two and three. We employ the following econometric model: 
Ear_Consit= β0 + β1SEC + β2IFRS + β3SEC*IFRS + β4INV + β5LN_SALESit + β6F_LEVit 
+ β7MBit + fixed effects  
 
where,   
Ear_Cons = is the earnings conservatism of firm i in year t  
MB = is the market to book ratio for firm i in year t 
 
The other variables were defined above. 
 
 
Obviously, our variables of interest are SEC, IFRS and SEC*IFRS. The sign of β1, β2 
and β3 shows the relation between secrecy, IFRS adoption and the joint effect on earnings 
quality.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 represents the number of firm and the number of firm- year observations for each 
country and descriptive statistics for the macro- level variables. Most of the firm year 
observations come from the United Kingdom with 7856 observations (40.65%) while about 
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15% of the total sample comes from Singapore and 11.7% comes from Germany. Ireland and 
Portugal have the lowest representation with 1.1%, followed by Israel and Belgium with 
approximate 1.6% of the total firm-year observations. In a robustness test we exclude the 
larger countries. 
The level of secrecy, the financial secrecy index (SEC), and investor protection are 
reported in table 2. SEC has a wide range from 34 for Spain to 78 for Switzerland. Table 2 
shows that Spain and Portugal have the lowest score for the judicial independence (JUD) 
while Denmark has the highest score of 6.6. The higher JUD, the higher independence of 
judiciary from other branches of governments, citizens or firms is. The value of the protection 
of minority shareholders (MIN) ranges from 3.7 for Italy to 5.6 for Singapore. It is clear that 
Singapore has the high protection for minority shareholders among countries. Another 
indicator of macro-level variables is the regulation of securities laws (RSE); Singapore again 
has the highest score of 6 for RSE while Spain has the lowest score of 3.7. When considering 
the irregular payment and bribes (IIPB) the score ranges from 4.1 for Italy to 6.7 for 
Singapore and Denmark. Finally, countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore have high 
financing through local equity market while Spain has poor performance in this category. As 
evident from table 2, Singapore and Hong Kong have strong investor protection.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Descriptive statistics for firm- level variables are reported in table 3.  The mean of 
Ab_Accruals is -0.012. The minimum value of Ab_Accruals is -0.0001 while the maximum 
value is 0.00562. In the sample, the mean of Ear_Cons is 0.00011 and the minimum and 
maximum values are 0.0002 and 0.00578 respectively. Approximately 59% of observations 
adopted IFRS, 42% reports a net loss. LN_SALES, measured by the natural logarithm of total 
sales, has a mean of 5.1254 and standard deviation of 2.1045.  Financial leverage (F_LEV) is 
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49.21%, the sales growth rate (S_GWTH) is 14.56%, and the growth rate of gross PPE 
(ΔPPE) is 15.68%. 
Descriptive statistics for the sub-sample for low secrecy countries (Panel B) shows 
that the mean of Ab_Accruals is -0.0013, Ear_Cons is 0.00010, LN_SALES is 5.125, F_LEV 
is 49.2%, and S_GWTH is 14.50%. 62% of the observations are for IFRS, and 42% of the 
observations include a net loss. Descriptive statistics for the high secrecy sub-samples (Panel 
C) indicate that the mean of Ab_Accruals is -0.0010, Ear_Cons is 0.0009, LN_SALES is 
5.1224, F_LEV is 49.11%, and S_GWTH is 14.16%. These values are lower than those of 
firms in low secrecy countries. Approximately 57% of the observations adopted IFRS and 
35% reports a net loss. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 4, panel A, shows that SEC is positively related to signed abnormal accruals 
(Ab_Accruals) while IFRS is negatively related to Ab_Accruals. Ab_Accruals is a good 
indicator for earnings management. The higher level of Ab_Accruals, the higher level of 
earnings management is. Therefore, the result of the Pearson Correlation matrix is consistent 
with our hypotheses 1 and 2. There is a negative relationship between secrecy and earnings 
quality and positive relationship between IFRS and earnings quality. Table 4 panel B shows 
the Pearson correlation matrix for the Ear_Cons sample (19,324 observations). The results 
indicate that there is positive association between Ear_Cons and SEC while there is negative 
association between Ear_Cons and IFRS. This suggests that Ear_Cons is higher in countries 
with low level of secrecy or with mandatory IFRS adoption. This result is in line with our 
hypotheses, suggesting that earnings quality is negatively associated with secrecy and 
positively related to IFRS adoption. 
5.2 Main results 
5.2.1. Signed abnormal accruals 
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The signed abnormal accruals analysis is represented in table 5. Each investor protection 
variable is tested once thus we have five regression models. All models are significant with 
adjusted R
2 
greater than 16% and the significance levels on the individual coefficients are 
reported as two- tailed p-values. 
The secrecy variable by itself represents the effect on accruals of firms as the level of 
secrecy is higher. The secrecy variable is significant (p<0.01) in all estimations. The positive 
sign of the coefficient on secrecy indicates that abnormal accruals in high secrecy countries 
are higher than those in low secrecy country. This result suggests that the secrecy level of a 
country has a negative effect on earnings quality. 
The IFRS variable measures the effect of IFRS adoption on abnormal accruals. As can 
be seen from table 4, the IFRS variable has negative coefficient and is significant in all 
models thus suggesting that adoption of  IFRS reduces abnormal accruals in firms. 
The interaction of secrecy with the IFRS variable measures the joint effect of secrecy 
and IFRS. The interaction term has a negative coefficient and is significant (p<0.01) in all 
models. A negative sign indicates that the abnormal accruals in IFRS adopters are relatively 
smaller compared to the accruals of non IFRS adopters in a high secrecy country. 
The conjunction of these results reveals that abnormal accruals are higher as a 
country‟s secrecy level is high. However this effect is mediated by the IFRS adoption; it turns 
out that abnormal accruals in high secrecy country are smaller when that country adopts 
IFRS. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
5.2.2. Earnings conservatism 
The earnings conservatism analysis is reported in table 5 with five logistic regression models. 
All models are significant with adjusted R
2
s of around 21 percent. The significance levels of 
individual coefficients is based on two- tailed p- values for asymptotic z-statistics. 
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The SEC variable captures the effect of secrecy on earnings conservatism. The 
coefficients are positive and significant (p<0.01) in all models. From these results we 
conclude that earning conservatism is higher in high secrecy countries than low secrecy 
countries. 
The IFRS variable tests whether firms with IFRS adoption are more likely to report 
less earnings conservatism than non IFRS adopters. Overall, the evidence indicates that firms 
adopting IFRS report less earnings conservatism than non- adopting firms. 
The interaction of IFRS with secrecy variable measures the joint effect of IFRS and 
secrecy on earnings conservatism. The coefficients are negative and significant in all models 
(p <0.01). On the basis of these results we conclude that the evidence consistently shows 
IFRS adoption reduces earnings conservatism in countries with high level of secrecy. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Overall, we observe the similar results across both signed abnormal accrual and 
earnings conservatism test. Earnings quality is lower in country with high secrecy level while 
earnings quality is higher in country with mandatory IFRS adoption. Signed abnormal 
accruals become smaller and earnings conservatism decreases following adoption of IFRS. 
IFRS adopters are required to follow the applicable accounting principles therefore firms 
have incentive to share information with outside investors. This eliminates effect of secrecy 
and enhances earnings quality. 
5.3 Robustness tests 
5.3.1. Alternative proxy for secrecy scores 
We examine the robustness of our results through an alternative measure for secrecy using 
Hofstede scores (1980) consistent with those used by Hope et al. (2008). Gray (1988) argues 
that the higher a country ranks in uncertainty avoidance level and power distance, the more 
likely it is to rank highly in secrecy. In addition, a preference for secrecy is consistent with 
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low level of individualism (Gray, 1988). Therefore, secrecy score is calculated as the sum of 
uncertainty avoidance (UA) and power distance (PD) scores less the individualism (IND) 
score (Hope et al. 2008). We take UA, PD and IND scores from Hofstede (1980). Our results 
(untabulated) based on this alternative measure for secrecy are qualitatively similar to those 
reported above in tables 5 and 6.  
[Insert Tables 7 & 8 here] 
5.3.2. Alternative proxy for investor protection 
Many prior studies, such as Francis and Wang, 2008 and Leuz et al, 2003, have applied the 
anti- director rights index developed by La Porta et al. (1998). However, this index has been 
criticized for its ad hoc nature and for several conceptual ambiguities and mistakes in coding 
(Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances, and Shleifer, 2008). Therefore, Djankov et al. (2008) 
introduce a revised and updated anti- director rights index based on laws and regulation 
applicable to publicly traded firms in May 2003. The revised index relies on the same basic 
dimensions of corporate law but has greater precision (Djankov et al. 2008).  
We thus test the robustness of our results using the revised anti-director rights index from 
Djankov et al. (2008). Our results (untabulated) based on the use of this index are 
qualitatively similar to those reported above in tables 5 and 6. In both signed abnormal 
accruals and earnings conservatism tests, the coefficient of SEC is positive and significant, 
which indicates that there is negative relation between SEC and earnings quality. The results 
also show no change for IFRS variable with a negative and significant coefficient. Moreover, 
the use of the revised anti- director rights index has resulted no change in the coefficient of 
the interaction of secrecy with IFRS. The interaction term has negative coefficient and is 
significant in all tests (p< 0.01).  
5.3.3. Subsamples (2003 vs 2011) 
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We re-estimated all of the models reported in Tables 5 and 6 by considering observations for 
2003 and 2011. The results (un-tabulated) were qualitatively similar to the results reported in 
Tables 5 and 6. 
5.3.4. Deleting United Kingdom (UK), Singapore and Germany. 
In order to have assurance that the larger countries with many observations do not drive the 
results, we retested the signed abnormal accruals and earnings conservatism for 11 countries 
excluding United Kingdom, Singapore and Germany. For the resulting sample of 6358 firm- 
years, we find qualitatively similar results to those in Tables 5 and 6 in terms of sign and 
statistical significance for the test variables of interest (results un-tabulated). We thus 
conclude that UK, Singapore and Germany do not drive the results. 
6. Conclusion 
We hypothesize that culture influences financial reporting quality. Specifically, we test 
whether the extent of secrecy in a country negatively impacts on earnings quality. Using 
19,324 firm year observations from 14 countries, we find evidence that there is a negative 
relation between secrecy and earnings quality. This finding is consistent with findings in 
other cross- country studies. Hope et al. (2008) indicates that firms in more secretive cultures 
are less likely to hire a Big 4 auditor; the reason is financial reporting quality of those firms is 
often low. Our study is in line with the findings in other cross-country studies that mandatory 
IFRS adoption improves earnings quality. For example, Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) 
find that firms applying IFRS evidence less earnings management, more timely loss 
recognition, and more value relevance of accounting amount than non-adopters. The results 
highlight the importance of high quality accounting standards in promoting earnings quality. 
This study adds to the discussion of the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption across 
countries. The results indicate that there is a significant positive association between the joint 
effect of IFRS adoption and secrecy on earnings quality. Specifically, signed abnormal 
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accruals and earnings conservatism decrease in a high secrecy country after IFRS adoption. 
IFRS encourages managers to apply high quality accounting standards, share information 
with outside investors, improving earnings quality. We conclude that the negative effect of 
secrecy on earnings quality is mediated by mandatory IFRS adoption.  
Our earnings quality study has certain limitations which reflect the aggregated cross-
country research design. Firstly, our analyses may not have considered the impact of other 
important macro level variables or investor protection variables on earnings quality. 
Secondly, the samples are taken from all developed countries and thus the variety in the 
samples is limited. Thirdly, the secrecy and investor protection are categorical in nature and 
difficult to measure. Finally, our study is based on only a short period following adoption of 
IFRS and the long term impact may be different. 
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Table 1 
 
Sample selection process 
 
 # Firm-years 
 
No. of observations with no missing values on dependent and independent variables 
 
 
20,625 
-No. of  financial institutions(SIC 6000-6999) (324) 
-No. of  Observations with any variables registering in the top or bottom 0.5%  (752) 
- No. of observations with │Studentized residuals│>3 (225) 
Study sample 19,324 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Number of firm-years and Descriptive statistics for macro-level variables 
 
Country No. of 
firm 
No. of 
Firm-
Years 
Secrecy 
  
SEC Investor Protection (INV) 
 
JUD MIN RSE IIPB FTEM 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Hong Kong 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Singapore 
Spain 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
 
72 
89 
159 
752 
178 
49 
59 
156 
201 
56 
496 
149 
154 
1287 
3857 
368 
318 
812 
2254 
898 
216 
316 
385 
1285 
217 
2856 
645 
898 
7856 
19324 
High 
High 
Low 
High 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
66 
59 
40 
57 
73 
44 
58 
49 
49 
51 
71 
34 
78 
45 
5.5 
5.3 
6.6 
6.3 
6.1 
6.3 
6.2 
4.0 
6.3 
3.9 
5.6 
3.9 
6.4 
6.2 
4.8 
5.0 
5.5 
4.8 
5.0 
4.5 
5.2 
3.7 
5.2 
4.5 
5.6 
4.3 
4.9 
5.2 
4.7 
5.0 
5.5 
4.5 
5.6 
3.9 
5.5 
4.3 
5.2 
4.9 
6.0 
3.7 
5.6 
5.1 
 
5.8 
5.7 
6.7 
5.9 
6.2 
6.1 
5.7 
4.1 
6.2 
5.1 
6.7 
5.0 
6.3 
5.9 
 
3.6 
3.9 
4.2 
4.0 
5.4 
2.9 
4.6 
3.6 
4.1 
3.4 
5.0 
3.3 
4.6 
4.6 
 
 
SEC is the Financial Secrecy Index from Tax Justice Network (2011). Investor Protection (INV) is the investor 
protection measured by five proxies (1) JUD is the judicial independence scores from World Economic Forum 
(2011), (2) MIN is the protection of minority shareholders‟ interest scores from World Economic Forum (2011), 
(3) RSE is the regulation of securities laws scores from World Economic Forum (2011), (4) IIPB is the irregular 
payment and bribes scores from World Economic Forum (2011), and (5) FTEM is the financing through local 
equity market scores from World Economic Forum (2011) . 
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive statistics for firm-level variables 
 
Variable Mean Median S.D Minimum Maximum 
 
Panel A: Full Sample (n=19,324) 
 
Ab_Accruals 
Ear_Cons 
IFRS 
LN_SALES 
F_LEV 
S_GWTH 
MB 
ΔPPE 
CFO 
LOSS 
-0.0012 
0.00011 
0.59 
5.1254 
0.4921 
0.1456 
4.1520 
0.15680 
0.14523 
0.42 
-0.0010 
-0.0009 
1 
5.8970 
0.5124 
0.1652 
4.9875 
0.17856 
0.13254 
1 
0.0114 
0.0110 
0.4561 
2.1045 
0.2695 
0.1132 
2.1342 
0.11245 
0.10254 
0.24513 
-0.0001 
0.0002 
0 
4.3678 
0.1259 
0.0895 
2.1458 
0.10254 
0.08974 
0 
0.00562 
0.00578 
1 
7.5624 
0.6594 
0.8765 
6.8795 
0.25789 
0.21031 
1 
 
Panel B: Low- Secrecy sub-samples 
 
Ab_Accruals 
Ear_Cons 
IFRS 
LN_SALES 
F_LEV 
S_GWTH 
MB 
ΔPPE 
CFO 
LOSS 
-0.0013 
0.00010 
0.62 
5.1250 
0.4920 
0.1450 
4.1521 
0.15681 
0.14658 
0.42 
-0.0011 
-0.0008 
1 
5.8901 
0.5120 
0.1650 
4.9870 
0.17850 
0.14253 
1 
0.0113 
0.0111 
0.4560 
2.1040 
0.2690 
0.1130 
2.1340 
0.11240 
0.10254 
0.24510 
-0.0001 
0.0001 
0 
4.3670 
0.1250 
0.0890 
2.1450 
0.10250 
0.10245 
0 
0.00560 
0.00570 
1 
7.5620 
0.6590 
0.8760 
6.8790 
0.25780 
0.20194 
1 
 
Panel C: High- Secrecy sub-samples 
 
Ab_Accruals 
Ear_Cons 
IFRS 
LN_SALES 
F_LEV 
S_GWTH 
MB 
ΔPPE 
CFO 
LOSS 
-0.0010 
0.0009 
0.57 
5.1224 
0.4911 
0.1416 
4.1220 
0.15280 
0.12245 
0.35 
-0.0009 
-0.0008 
1 
5.887 
0.5114 
0.1622 
4.9475 
0.17156 
0.12453 
1 
0.0104 
0.0101 
0.4510 
2.1045 
0.2615 
0.1112 
2.1142 
0.11215 
0.10245 
0.21233 
-0.0000 
0.0001 
0 
4.3698 
0.1249 
0.0815 
2.1258 
0.10154 
0.0987 
0 
0.00501 
0.00538 
1 
7.5614 
0.6544 
0.8565 
6.8695 
0.25189 
0.21032 
1 
 
Ab_Accruals is the signed abnormal accruals of firm i in year t under DeFond and Park (2001) model (Francis 
and Wang 2008 and Houqe et al., 2012). Ear_Cons is based alternatively on the Givoly and Hayn (2000) and 
Artiach and Clarkson (2012) accruals based measure of conservatism. IFRS takes the value of 1 for a given firm 
i in year t adopted IFRS mandatory basis and 0, otherwise. LN_SALES is natural logarithm of total sales of firm 
i in year t. F_LEV is the end of year total long term debt  divided by end of year shareholders‟ equity of firm i in 
year t.  S_GWTH  is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in prior year and 
divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t. ΔPPE is the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE 
in current year minus the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for firm i in year t. 
CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets. LOSS takes the value of 1 if firm i in 
year t reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4  
 
Parsons Correlation Matrix 
 
Panel A: Abs- accruals sample (N= 19,324) 
 
 Ab_Accruals SEC IFRS 
 
Ab_Accruals 
 
1 
 
  
SEC 0.4010
*** 
(0.000) 
1  
IFRS -0.2045
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.3012
*** 
(0.000) 
1 
 
Panel B: Ear_Cons sample (N= 19,324) 
 
 Ear_Cons SEC IFRS 
 
Ear_Cons 
 
1 
 
  
SEC 0.3510
*** 
(0.000) 
1  
IFRS -0.125
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.2010
*** 
(0.000) 
1 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail 
 
Ab_Accruals is the signed abnormal accruals of firm i in year t under DeFond and Park (2001) model (Francis 
and Wang 2008 and Houqe et al., 2012). Ear_Cons is based alternatively on the Givoly and Hayn (2000) and 
Artiach and Clarkson (2012) accruals based measure of conservatism. SEC is the Financial Secrecy Index from 
Tax Justice Network (2011). IFRS takes the value of 1 for a given firm i in year t adopted IFRS mandatory basis 
and 0, otherwise.  
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Table 5 
 
Ab_Accrualsit = β0 + β1SEC + β2IFRS + β3SEC*IFRS + β4INV + β5LN_SALESit + β6F_LEVit + β7S_GWTHit + 
β8ΔPPEit + β9 CFOit + β10LAGLOSSit + fixed effects  
 
Independent 
variables 
INV = JUD INV = MIN  INV = RSE INV =IIPB INV = FTEM 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
SEC 0.0012*** 
(0.000) 
0.0011*** 
(0.001) 
0.0013*** 
(0.004) 
0.0010*** 
(0.005) 
0.0011*** 
(0.001) 
IFRS -0.0001* 
(0.054) 
-0.0001** 
(0.034) 
-0.0000* 
(0.074) 
-0.0001** 
(0.044) 
-0.0001* 
(0.084) 
SEC*IFRS -0.0017*** 
  (0.000) 
-0.0016*** 
  (0.001) 
-0.0014*** 
  (0.001) 
-0.0013*** 
  (0.000) 
-0.0015*** 
  (0.000) 
INV -0.0080*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0079*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0081*** 
(0.000) 
0.0084*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0080*** 
(0.000) 
LN_SALES -0.0091** 
(0.068) 
-0.0090** 
(0.060) 
-0.0089** 
(0.058) 
-0.0090** 
(0.060) 
-0.0092** 
(0.058) 
F_LEV 0.0015* 
(0.056) 
0.0014* 
(0.057) 
0.0013* 
(0.059) 
0.0014* 
(0.054) 
0.0013* 
(0.052) 
S_GWTH -0.0013* 
(0.084) 
-0.0011* 
(0.094) 
-0.0014* 
(0.064) 
-0.0013* 
(0.074) 
-0.0013* 
(0.064) 
ΔPPE -0.0012 
(0.258) 
-0.0010 
(0.216) 
-0.0010 
(0.202) 
-0.0010 
(0.251) 
-0.0011 
(0.234) 
CFO -0.0045*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0042*** 
(0.004) 
-0.0046*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0049*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0042*** 
(0.002) 
LOSS 0.0014* 
(0.065) 
0.0012** 
(0.045) 
0.0011* 
(0.075) 
0.0013* 
(0.069) 
0.0011* 
(0.060) 
Intercept  0.0034*** 
(0.004) 
0.0036*** 
(0.003) 
0.0038*** 
(0.001) 
0.0037*** 
(0.002) 
0.0030*** 
(0.006) 
Fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.1689 0.1725 0.1625 0.1714 0.1658 
N 19,324 19,324 19,324 19,324 19,324 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to heteroscedasticity and 
country clustering effects using the method in Rogers (1993).  
 
Ab_Accruals is the signed abnormal accruals of firm i in year t under DeFond and Park (2001) model (Francis 
and Wang 2008 and Houqe et al., 2012). SEC is the Financial Secrecy Index from Tax Justice Network (2011). 
IFRS takes the value of 1 for a given firm i in year t adopted IFRS mandatory basis and 0, otherwise. INV is the 
investor protection measured by five proxies (1) JUD is the judicial independence scores from World Economic 
Forum (2011), (2) MIN is the protection of minority shareholders‟ interest scores from World Economic Forum 
(2011), (3) RSE is the regulation of securities laws scores from World Economic Forum (2011), (4) IIPB is the 
irregular payment and bribes scores from World Economic Forum (2011), and (5) FTEM is the financing 
through local equity market scores from World Economic Forum (2011) . LN_SALES is natural logarithm of 
total sales of firm i in year t. F_LEV is the end of year total long term debt  divided by end of year shareholders‟ 
equity of firm i in year t.  S_GWTH is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in 
prior year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t. ΔPPE is the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as 
the gross PPE in current year minus the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for 
firm i in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets. LOSS takes the value 
of 1 if firm i in year t reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. Fixed effects are (i) 
Industry dummies, a vector of dummy variables indicating industry sector membership. (ii) Year dummies, a 
vector of dummy variables indicating Year. 
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Table 6 
 
Ear_Consit= β0 + β1SEC + β2IFRS + β3SEC*IFRS + β4INV + β5LN_SALESit + β6F_LEVit + β7MBit + fixed 
effects  
 
Independent 
variables 
INV = JUD INV = MIN  INV = RSE INV =IIPB INV = FTEM 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
SEC 0.0014*** 
(0.001) 
0.0018*** 
(0.000) 
0.0019*** 
(0.003) 
0.0020*** 
(0.000) 
0.0021*** 
(0.000) 
IFRS -0.0000* 
(0.064) 
-0.0001** 
(0.034) 
-0.0000* 
(0.094) 
-0.0001* 
(0.084) 
-0.0000* 
(0.094) 
SEC*IFRS -0.0024*** 
  (0.000) 
-0.0025*** 
  (0.001) 
-0.0023*** 
  (0.001) 
-0.0022*** 
  (0.001) 
-0.0025*** 
  (0.000) 
INV 0.0090*** 
(0.002) 
0.0089*** 
(0.002) 
0.0091*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0095*** 
(0.001) 
0.0078*** 
(0.004) 
LN_SALES -0.0082** 
(0.058) 
-0.0085** 
(0.078) 
-0.0086** 
(0.054) 
-0.0089** 
(0.062) 
-0.0090** 
(0.051) 
F_LEV 0.0010* 
(0.066) 
0.0012* 
(0.067) 
0.0011* 
(0.069) 
0.0012* 
(0.074) 
0.0014* 
(0.062) 
MB -0.0010* 
(0.094) 
-0.0012* 
(0.092) 
-0.0013* 
(0.074) 
-0.0012* 
(0.064) 
-0.0012* 
(0.074) 
Intercept  0.0044*** 
(0.003) 
0.0046*** 
(0.000) 
0.0048*** 
(0.000) 
0.0047*** 
(0.000) 
0.0050*** 
(0.000) 
Fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.2213 0.2145 0.2125 0.2214 0.2014 
N 19,324 19,324 19,324 19,324 19,324 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to heteroscedasticity and 
country clustering effects using the method in Rogers (1993).  
 
Ear_Cons is based alternatively on the Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Artiach and Clarkson (2012) accruals based 
measure of conservatism. SEC is the Financial Secrecy Index from Tax Justice Network (2011). IFRS takes the 
value of 1 for a given firm i in year t adopted IFRS mandatory basis and 0, otherwise. INV is the investor 
protection measured by five proxies (1) JUD is the judicial independence scores from World Economic Forum 
(2011), (2) MIN is the protection of minority shareholders‟ interest scores from World Economic Forum (2011), 
(3) RSE is the regulation of securities laws scores from World Economic Forum (2011), (4) IIPB is the irregular 
payment and bribes scores from World Economic Forum (2011), and (5) FTEM is the financing through local 
equity market scores from World Economic Forum (2011) . LN_SALES is natural logarithm of total sales of firm 
i in year t. F_LEV is the end of year total long term debt divided by end of year shareholders‟ equity of firm i in 
year t. MB is the market to book ratio for firm i in year t. Fixed effects are (i) Industry dummies, a vector of 
dummy variables indicating industry sector membership. (ii) Year dummies, a vector of dummy variables 
indicating Year. 
 
